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Abstract
This short note revisits the problem of designing secure minimum storage regenerating (MSR) codes
for distributed storage systems. A secure MSR code ensures that a distributed storage system does not
reveal the stored information to a passive eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is assumed to have access to
the content stored on ℓ1 number of storage nodes in the system and the data downloaded during the band-
width efficient repair of an additional ℓ2 number of storage nodes. This note combines the Gabidulin
codes based precoding [18] and a new construction of MSR codes (without security requirements) by Ye
and Barg [27] in order to obtain secure MSR codes. Such optimal secure MSR codes were previously
known in the setting where the eavesdropper was only allowed to observe the repair of ℓ2 nodes among
a specific subset of k nodes [7, 18]. The secure coding scheme presented in this note allows the eaves-
dropper to observe repair of any ℓ2 ouf of n nodes in the system and characterizes the secrecy capacity
of linear repairable MSR codes.
1 Introduction
Consider a distributed storage system that stores a file f of size M (symbols over a finite field F) on a
network of n storage nodes such that the file f can be reconstructed from the content of any k out of n
nodes in the system. In [3], Dimakis et al. study the issue of recovering the content stored in a node by
downloading a small amount of data from the remaining nodes in the system. This problem is referred to
as the node repair problem. The ability to conduct node repair is useful in maintaining the redundancy
level of the system in the event of a node failure. Moreover, the content of a temporarily unavailable node
can be accessed using the rest of the (available) nodes in the system by treating the unavailable node as
a failure and invoking the mechanism to repair this node. Dimakis et al. introduce repair-bandwidth, the
number of symbols downloaded to repair a node, as a metric to quantify the efficiency of the node repair
mechanism [3]. Assuming that each node stores α symbols (over F) and the node repair mechanism requires
contacting d ≥ k storage nodes and downloading β symbols from each of the contacted nodes, [3] presents
the following fundamental trade-off between the repair-bandwidth dβ and per node storage α.
M≤
k∑
i=1
min
{
α, (d − i+ 1)β
}
. (1)
The codes that operate at this trade-off are referred to as regenerating codes [3]. In particular, the codes
corresponding to the minimum storage point, i.e., α = M
k
, are called minimum storage regenerating (MSR)
1
codes. Note that an MSR code is an MDS vector code [12] and operates at the following point on the
trade-off defined by the bound in (1).(
α, β
)
=
(
M
k
,
α
d− k + 1
)
=
(
M
k
,
M
k(d− k + 1)
)
. (2)
An MSR code is said to be exact-repairable if its repair mechanism ensures reconstruction of the data
that is identical to the content stored on the node being repaired. The exact-repairable MSR codes form
an attractive class of coding schemes as they preserve the structure of the storage system throughout the
operation of the system. The problem of designing exact-repairable MSR codes has been extensively studied
in [2,5,14,16,17,19,20,24] and references therein. Recently, Ye and Barg present explicit constructions for
exact-repairable MSR codes for all values of system parameters n, k and d in [27, 28]. These constructions
enable repair of all nodes in the system as opposed to some of the earlier constructions (e.g. the constructions
from [2, 24]) which enable bandwidth-efficient repair only for a particular set of k (systematic) nodes.
In this document, we address the issue of designing distributed storage systems that protect the stored
information against eavesdropping attacks. Given increasing utilization of distributed storage systems (a.k.a.
cloud storage) for storing valuable and confidential information, it is important that these systems prevent
leakage of the stored information to an unauthorized and (or) adversarial agent. In this paper, we present
a coding scheme that is information theoretically secure against an eavesdropper who can observe the data
downloaded during the repair of ℓ2 storage nodes and access the content stored on ℓ1 (additional) nodes.
The secure coding scheme enables exact-repair of all nodes in the system with d = n − 1 and operates at
the MSR point. The scheme is obtained by combining Gabidulin codes based precoding scheme [18] with
a code construction presented in [27]. We note that the obtained coding scheme characterizes the secrecy
capacity [15] of those distributed storage systems that employ linear repair mechanisms and operate at the
MSR point.
2 Background and related work
In this section we formally define the underlying eavesdropper model and the associated secrecy capacity.
We then present a brief description two key components of our secure coding schemes: 1) Gabidulin pre-
coding scheme and 2) a code construction from [27]. We conclude the section with a discussion on the prior
work in the area of designing secure coding schemes for distributed storage systems.
2.1 System model
We consider a DSS with n storage nodes where each node stores α symbols over a finite field F. We assume
that the DSS employs a coding scheme such that content of any k out of n nodes in the system is sufficient
to construct the content stored in the remaining n − k nodes. Furthermore, we assume that the content of
every node in the system can be exactly reconstructed by contacting any d out of (n − 1) remaining nodes
and downloading β symbols (over F) from each of the contacted nodes. It follows from the Singleton bound
that such a system can store a file with at most kα (independent) symbols (over F). In fact, an MDS coding
scheme does store a file f of size M = kα symbols (over F). For such coding schemes, it follows from the
work of Dimakis et al. [3] that
β ≥
α
d− k + 1
. (3)
Here, we focus on the DSS employing those exact-repairable coding schemes that are both storage and
repair-bandwidth efficient, i.e., we have that
(α, β) =
(M
k
,
M
k(d− k + 1)
)
. (4)
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2.2 Eavesdropper model and secrecy capacity
We consider the (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper model introduced in [22]. Let n nodes in the DSS are indexed by the
set [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. For ℓ1 and ℓ2 such that ℓ1 + ℓ2 < k, an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper can directly access
the content stored on any ℓ1 storage nodes indexed by the set E1 ⊂ [n]. Additionally, the eavesdropper
observes the data downloaded during the repair of any ℓ2 storage nodes indexed by the set E2 ⊂ [n]. The
nodes indexed by the sets E1 and E2 are referred to as storage-eavesdropped and download-eavesdropped
nodes, respectively. Note that a download-eavesdropped node may reveal more information compared to a
storage-eavesdropped node as the content stored on a node is a function of the data downloaded during its
repair. In this document we focus on coding schemes that are information theoretically secure against an
(ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper. We formalize this notion in the following definition.
Definition 1. Let f s be a secure file of size Ms symbols (over F). We say that the DSS securely stores f s
against an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper, if we have
I(f s; e(E1, E2)) = 0 ∀E1, E2 ⊂ [n] such that |E1| = ℓ1 and |E2| = ℓ2.
Here, e(E1, E2) denotes the observations of an eavesdropped with its storage-eavesdropped and download-
eavesdropped nodes indexed by the sets E1 and E2, respectively. Equivalently, we also say that the DSS
achieves a secure file size Ms.
Remark 1. The secrecy capacity of a DSS against an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper is defined as the maximum secure
file size achieved by the DSS. In other words, the secrecy capacity of a DSS denotes the maximum sized
secure file that it can store without leaking any information to an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper.
2.3 Preliminaries
As described in Section 2.1 and 2.2, we aim to store a secure file f s of size Ms symbols (over F) in a DSS
that stores M symbols (over F) without any security guarantees. Moreover, the DSS is required to operate
at the MSR point which is defined by the parameters given in (4). Towards this we utilize M−Ms random
symbols (over F). The following lemma from [22, 26] allows us to argue that the proposed coding scheme
is secure against an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper.
Lemma 1 (Secrecy Lemma [22, 26]). Let f s be the secure file that needs to be stored on a DSS and r be
random symbols (independent of f s). Let e(E1, E2) be the observations of an eavesdropped with its storage-
eavesdropped and download-eavesdropped nodes indexed by the sets E1 and E2, respectively. If we have
H
(
e(E1, E2)
)
≤ H(r) and H
(
r|f s, e(E1, E2)
)
= 0, then
I
(
f s; e(E1, E2)
)
= 0.
2.3.1 Gabidulin precoding
Given a vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , aK) ∈ FK and K points Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yK} ⊆ FK which are linearly
independent (over a subfield B of F), the Gabidulin precoding of a is obtained in two steps.
• First, construct a linearized polynomial ma(x) with the vector a defining its coefficients as follows.
ma(x) =
K−1∑
i=0
ai+1x
|B|i =
K−1∑
i=0
ai+1x
[i], (5)
where, for a positive integer i, we use x[i] to denote x|B|i .
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• Evaluate the linearized polynomial ma(x) at the given set of K points Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yK} ⊆ FK
to obtain the associated Gabidulin precoded vector
p(a;Y) =
(
ma(y1),ma(y2), . . . ,ma(yK)
)
∈ FK . (6)
2.3.2 Ye and Barg construction [27]
In [27], Ye and Barg present multiple code constructions for the MSR codes for all values of n, k and d.
These are the first fully explicit constructions of this nature. Here, we briefly describe one of the construc-
tions from [27] which we utilize to construct secure coding schemes at the MSR point. Similarly, other
constructions from [27] can also be utilized to obtain secure coding scheme.
Construction 1. For an element a ∈
{
0, 1, . . . , (n − k)n−1
}
,
(an−1, an−2, . . . , a1) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− k − 1}
n−1
denotes the (n − k)-ary vector representation of the element a. For a ∈
{
0, 1, . . . , (n − k)n−1
}
, u ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n − k − 1} and i ∈ [n − 1], a(i, u) ∈
{
0, 1, . . . , (n − k)n−1
}
denotes the element with the
following (n− k)-ary vector representation.
(an−1, an−2, . . . , ai+1, u, ai−1, . . . , a1) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− k − 1}
n−1. (7)
Let B be a field with |B| ≥ n+1 and γ ∈ B be its primitive element. An MSR code C with α = (n− k)n−1
is defined by the following (n− k)α× nα parity check matrix.
H =

I I · · · I I
A1 A2 · · · An−1 I
A21 A
2
2 · · · A
2
n−1 I
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
An−k−11 A
n−k−1
2 · · · A
n−k−1
n−1 I
 ∈ B(n−k)α×nα, (8)
where I denotes the α × α identity matrix. For i ∈ [n − 1], Ai is an α × α matrix which is defined as
follows.
Ai =
(n−k)n−1−1∑
a=0
λi,aieae
T
a(i,ai⊕1)
∈ Bα×α, (9)
where⊕ denotes addition modulo (n−k), λi,0 = γi and λi,u = 1, ∀ u ∈ [n−k−1]. Here, {ea}
a∈
{
0,1,...,(n−k)n−1
}
denotes the collection of α = (n − k)n−1 standard basis vectors in Bα, i.e., all but a-th coordinate of the
vector ea are equal to zero and the a-th coordinate has its entry equal to 1.
Let c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C ⊆ Bnα denote a codeword of the MSR code defined by the parity check
matrix H (cf. (8)), i.e.,
Hc = 0. (10)
For i ∈ [n], we have that
ci =
(
ci,0, ci,1, . . . , ci,α−1
)
∈ Bα,
which denotes the α = (n − k)n−1 symbols stored on the i-th storage node in the system. In [27], Ye and
Barg show that the code defined by H is an MDS array code, i.e.,
|C| =
∣∣{c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Bnα : Hc = 0}∣∣ = |B|kα
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and for any codeword (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C and any set S =
{
i1, i2, . . . , ik
}
⊆ [n], the kα symbols(
ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik
)
are sufficient to reconstruct the entire codeword (c1, c2, . . . , cn). Furthermore, Ye and
Barg establish that the code C is an MSR code with d = n− 1, i.e., for any (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C and i ∈ [n],
the α symbols stored on the i-th node ci can be reconstructed by downloading αn−k symbols (over B) from
each of the remaining n − 1 nodes. In particular, for i ∈ [n − 1], ci can be reconstructed by downloading
the following symbols. {
cj,a : j 6= i and ai = 0
}
. (11)
Similarly, cn can be reconstructed by downloading the following symbols.{
cj,a : j 6= n and a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an−1 = 0
}
. (12)
We refer the reader to [27] for the further details of the construction.
2.4 Related work
Pawar et al. formally begin the study of the problem of designing coding schemes for DSS that are secure
against passive eavesdropping attacks in [15]. For a distributed storage system that has per node storage
α and requires downloading β symbols from d intact nodes during the repair of a failed node, Pawar at al.
obtain the following upper bound on its secrecy capacity [15].
Ms ≤
k∑
i=ℓ1+ℓ2+1
min
{
α, (d − i+ 1)β
}
. (13)
Recall that we are only considering those distributed storage systems where the content of any k out of
n storage nodes is sufficient to reconstruct the entire stored information. In [22], Shah et al. utilize the
product-matrix construction [16] for minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) codes to construct coding
schemes that are secure against an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper for all values of ℓ1 and ℓ2 such that ℓ1 + ℓ2 < k.
These coding schemes operate at α = dβ and attain the bound on the secrecy capacity in (13). Shah et
al. also utilize the product-matrix construction for MSR codes to design secure MSR coding schemes that
achieves secure file size of
Ms = (k − ℓ1 + ℓ2)(α − ℓ2β) (14)
against an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper [22]. Note that, for ℓ2 ≥ 1, there is a gap between the bound in (14) and
the secure file size achieved in (14). In [18], Rawat et al. obtained an improved bound on the secure file size
achievable at the MSR point.
Ms ≤
k−ℓ∑
i=ℓ1+1
(
α−H(Di,E2)
)
, (15)
where E2 denotes the set ℓ2 download-eavesdropped nodes and Di,E2 denotes the data sent by the i-th node
for the repair of the storage nodes indexed by the set E2. Furthermore, for linear repair schemes with
d = n− 1 and ℓ2 ≤ 2, the bound in (15) specializes to the following [18].
Ms ≤ (k − ℓ1 + ℓ2)
(
1−
1
n− k
)ℓ2
α. (16)
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In [7], Goparaju et al. show that the bound in (16) holds for all values of ℓ2. They further generalize this
bound and show that for linear repair schemes with k ≤ d ≤ n − 1, the secure file size achievable at the
MSR point satisfies the following [7].
Ms ≤ (k − ℓ1 + ℓ2)
(
1−
1
d− k + 1
)ℓ2
α. (17)
As for the achievability schemes, for d = n−1, Rawat et al. obtain a secure coding scheme at the MSR point
that attain the bound in (16) provided that, whenever ℓ2 ≥ 2, download-eavesdropped nodes are restricted
to a fixed set of k nodes among the n nodes in the system. This coding scheme is obtained by combining
the Gabidulin precoding (cf. Section 2.3.1) with the zigzag codes from [24]. We also note that for ℓ2 = 1,
the secure coding scheme from [22] is optimal as it attains the bound in (15). Recently, Huang et al. further
explore the problem of characterizing the secrecy capacity of MSR codes in [8]. For β = 1, the secure
files size in (14) is shown to be optimal [8, 21]. Huang et al. show that optimality of the bound in (14) for
the MSR codes with the bounded values of β. The problem of obtaining bounds on the secrecy capacity
of distributed storage systems is also studied in [25] under the non black-box version of the problem. For
brevity, we skip a discussion on this and refer the reader to [6, 25].
In this paper, we establish that for linear repairable DSS with d = n − 1, the bound in (16) is the exact
characterization of the secrecy capacity of an MSR code. One of the codes constructions of MSR codes
from [27] (cf. Section 2.3.2) enables us to remove the restriction appearing in the secure coding scheme
from [18] that the download-eavesdropped nodes be restricted to a subset of k nodes. As for the possibility
of attaining a larger secure file size by utilizing non-linear repair schemes, Goparaju et al. show Pareto
optimality of the linear repairable MSR codes among those MSR codes that simultaneously allow for all
values of ℓ2 during the design of a secure coding scheme operating at the MSR point [6].
The cooperative regenerating codes enable simultaneous bandwidth efficient repair of multiple node
failures [10, 23]. Security of DSS employing cooperative regenerating codes against passive eavesdropping
attacks is explored in [9, 11]. Locally repairable codes (LRCs) is another class of codes designed to be
employed in distributed storage systems [4, 13]. These codes aim at repairing a failed node by contacting
a small number of surviving nodes in the system. We note that the problem of designing secure locally
repairable codes against passive eavesdropping attacks is considered in [1, 18].
3 Secure MSR codes
In this section we present a linear repairable coding scheme that operates at the MSR point with d = n− 1
and achieve the optimal secure file size in this setting.
Construction 2. Let n and k be given system parameters. Let f s be a secure file of size
Ms = (k − ℓ1 − ℓ2)
(
1−
1
n− k
)ℓ
(n− k)n−1 (18)
symbols (over a finite field F). We assume that we have F = BQ, where Q ≥ k(n − k)n−1 (cf. (18)) and
|B| ≥ n + 1. Let α = (n − k)n−1 and M = kα = k(n − r)n−1. We now generate a coding scheme that
securely stores the file f s against an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropped in the following two step process.
1. Let r denote M−Ms i.i.d. random symbols (independent of f s) that are uniformly distributed over F.
We take M linearly independent point (over B) Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yM} ⊂ F and perform Gabidulin
precoding of the vector a = (e, f s) ∈ FM as defined in Section 2.3.1. Let f denote the precoded
vector, i.e.,
f = p(a,Y) =
(
ma(y1),ma(y2), . . . ,ma(yM)
)
∈ FM, (19)
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where ma(x) is the linearized polynomial associated with the vector a = (r, f s) as define in (5), i.e.,
ma(x) =
M−1∑
i=0
ai+1x
[i]. (20)
2. Let G be a kα × nα generator matrix for the MSR code C with d = n − 1 and α = (n − k)n−1
obtained by Construction 1 (cf. Section 2.3.2), i.e.,
GHT = 0, (21)
where 0 denotes the kα-length zero vector. Given the precoded vector f from the previous stage, we
obtain the associated code vector in C as follows.
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) = f ·G ∈ C ⊆ F
nα. (22)
For i ∈ [n], the i-th storage node stores the α = (n− k)n−1 symbols in the subvector ci (cf. (22)).
The repairability of the proposed coding scheme with the repair-bandwidth
(
n−1
n−k
)
·α symbols (over F)
follows from the repairability of the code C (cf. 2.3.2). Next, we argue that the proposed coding scheme is
secure against an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper. Towards this, we present the following simple lemma.
Lemma 2. Let S ⊆ [n]. For j ∈ [n]\S , let Dj,S denote the symbols downloaded from the j-th storage node
during the repair of the storage nodes indexed by the set S . Then, we have
∣∣Dj,S∣∣ =
(
1−
(
1−
1
n− k
)|S|)
· (n− k)n−1. (23)
Proof. We divide the proof in two cases:
• Case 1 (n /∈ S): It follows from (11) that∣∣Dj,S∣∣ = ∣∣∣ ⋃
i∈S
{
cj,a ; ai = 0
}∣∣∣
= (n− k)n−1 −
∣∣∣ ⋂
i∈S
{
cj,a ; ai 6= 0
}∣∣∣
= (n− k)n−1 − (n− k)n−1−|S| · (n − k − 1)|S|
=
(
1−
(
1−
1
n− k
)|S|)
· (n− k)n−1. (24)
• Case 2 (n ∈ S): Let’s define S˜ = S\{n}. It follows from (11) and (12) that∣∣Dj,S∣∣ = ∣∣∣ ⋃
i∈S˜
{
cj,a ; ai = 0
}
∪
{
cj,a : a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an−1 = 0
}∣∣∣
= (n− k)n−1 −
∣∣∣ ⋂
i∈S˜
{
cj,a ; ai 6= 0
}
∩
{
cj,a : a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an−1 6= 0
}∣∣∣
= (n− k)n−1 − (n − k)n−1−|S˜| · (n− k − 1)|S˜| ·
(
n− k + 1
n− k
)
=
(
1−
(
1−
1
n− k
)|S|)
· (n− k)n−1. (25)
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This completes the proof.
Proposition 1. The coding scheme described in Construction 2 is secure against an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is very similar to the proof of [18, Theorem 18]. Let E1 and E2 denote
the indices of the storage-eavesdropped and download-eavesdropped nodes, respectively. Let’s consider a
set of k − |E1| − |E2| = k − ℓ1 − ℓ2 storage nodes R such that R ∩
{
E1 ∪ E2
}
= ∅. Let e
(
E1, E2
)
denote
the symbols observed by the eavesdropper. Note that
e
(
E1, E2
)
=
{
ci : i ∈ E1
}⋃{ ⋃
i∈E2
{
∪j 6=i Dj,i
}}
. (26)
Consider
H
(
e
(
E1, E2
))
= H
({
ci : i ∈ E1
}⋃{ ⋃
i∈E2
{
∪j 6=i Dj,i
}})
(a)
= H
({
ci : i ∈ E1 ∪ E2
}⋃{ ⋃
i∈E2
{
∪j 6=i Dj,i
}})
= H
({
ci : i ∈ E1 ∪ E2
})
+H
⋃
i∈E2
{
∪j 6=i Dj,i
}}∣∣∣{ci : i ∈ E1 ∪ E2}

(b)
= (ℓ1 + ℓ2)α+H
( ⋃
i∈E2
{
∪j∈R Dj,i
}})
= (ℓ1 + ℓ2)α+H
(
∪j∈R Dj,E2
)
≤ (ℓ1 + ℓ2)α+
∑
j∈R
H
(
Dj,E2
)
≤ (ℓ1 + ℓ2)α+
∑
j∈R
∣∣Dj,E2∣∣
(c)
= (ℓ1 + ℓ2) · (n − k)
n−1 + (k − ℓ1 − ℓ2) ·
(
1−
(
1−
1
n− k
)ℓ2)
· (n− k)n−1
= k · (n − k)n−1 − (k − ℓ1 − ℓ2) ·
(
1−
1
n− k
)ℓ2
· (n− k)n−1
=M−Ms = H(r). (27)
where step (a) follows from the fact that for i ∈ E2, ci is a function of the symbols in the set
{
∪j 6=i Dj,i
}
.
The steps (b) and (c) follow from [8, Lemma 5] and Lemma 2, respectively.
Since G is a generator matrix of an MDS array code, it follows from [18, Lemma 9] that the symbols in
the set
{ci : i ∈ E1 ∪ E2
}⋃{
∪j∈R Dj,E2
}
(28)
correspond to the evaluations of the linearized polynomial ma(x) (cf. (20)) at∣∣{ci : i ∈ E1 ∪ E2}⋃{ ∪j∈R Dj,E2}∣∣ =M−Ms
linearly independent (over B) points in F. Note that the symbols in (26) can be obtained from the symbols
observed by the eavesdropper e
(
E1, E2
) (cf. (26)). Given the secure file f s, one can remove the contribution
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of f s from these evaluations of ma(x) to obtain the M−Ms evaluations of the following polynomial at
the M−Ms linearly independent (over B) points in F.
mr(x) =
M−Ms−1∑
i=0
ai+1x
[i] =
M−Ms−1∑
i=0
ri+1x
[i], (29)
where the last equality holds as the first M−Ms coordinates of the vector a are composed of M−Ms
random symbols r (cf. Construction 2). Now, it is straightforward from [18, Remark 8] that these evaluations
are sufficient to recover the coefficients of the linearized polynomial mr(x). In other words, we have that
H
(
r | f s, e(E1, E2)
)
= 0. (30)
It follows from (27) and (30) that the coding scheme defined in Construction 2 satisfies the both requirements
of Lemma 1. Thus, we have
I
(
f s; e(E1, E2)
)
= 0.
Since the choice of E1 and E2 is arbitrary, this establishes that the coding scheme obtained by Construction 2
is secure against an (ℓ1, ℓ2)-eavesdropper.
4 Conclusion
We characterize the secrecy capacity of linear repairable MSR codes with d = n − 1 against a passive
eavesdropping attack, where the eavesdropper is allowed to observe repair of ℓ2 storage nodes in addition
to the content stored on ℓ1 storage nodes. One of the code constructions for MSR codes from [27] proves
instrumental in establishing this result. It is an interesting question to establish the similar results for general
values of d ∈ {k, k+1, . . . , n−1}. Another direction for future work is to characterize the secrecy capacity
of minimum storage cooperative regenerating (MSCR) codes.
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